7.4 POLICE MISCONDUCT, CORRUPTION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
A police officer in this country is vested with considerable power. An officer can interrupt or suspend a person’s constitutional rights. They have the authority to use, carry, and display firearms for the protection of themselves or others. In a situation warranting the use of deadly force, the officer may legally take the life of another person. Because of this conferring of certain “privileges” following a rigorous hiring and training process, certain officers may fall prey to a sense of superiority over others. This can lead to corruption at levels ranging from minor and possibly unnoticed to scandalous and possibly criminal events.
According to the Bureau of Justice, “Only 0.02% of the police officers in the U.S. engage in some type of corruption” (as cited in Morey, 2019, para. 2). Even with such a small percentage, we cannot lose sight of the fact that people are being victimized by it. However, we must remember that the media—print, online, or televised—is a for-profit business. The best way to accomplish the bottom line of selling stories is to create sensational, often salacious, headlines or broadcast teasers designed to focus a viewer’s attention on the screen. How often in the opening “breaking news” segment involving an officer-involved shooting is it suggested that the officer acted in a willful or wanton disregard for the life of the victim? When the police representative, often an expert and seasoned public information officer, is asked questions at the scene, their response beyond the most basic information will be “no comment.” Viewers often perceive these statements to mean that the police have something to hide or that some corrupt action took place at some stage of the interaction with the victim. In fact, the investigation is likely only minutes old and will often take days, weeks, months, and sometimes over a year to to determine exactly what took place and where fault lies. Washington State mandates independent investigations to remove bias and improve departmental transparency (Wash. Admin. Code § 139.12.030 (2020)). The media will likely move on from the story if details are provided transparently as soon as they are learned and can be released for public consumption without compromising the investigation. The independent investigation team (IIT) releases this information once the investigation is complete.
Sometimes during an independently conducted police investigation, the notion of a police cover-up may arise. However, unless and until the investigation is concluded and the officer’s actions are validated, no one—the public, media representatives, and even others within the officer’s own agency—can truly appreciate why the officer in that situation acted, processed actions, or made the tactical force decisions they did. The purpose of the independent investigation is to look at the facts known at the time of the incident and how they were perceived at that time by the officer. Afterward, pertinent facts to the investigation will be uncovered in the form of physical evidence, witness statements, and video and audio captured.
It is because of the public trust and confidence placed on the officer in this dramatic, stressful, yet glamorous occupation that corruption cannot be allowed to occur and certainly not to be disregarded if noticed. Condoning corruption by one paints a broad brush across the entire profession. If corruption allegations are made, they must be rigorously investigated and, if warranted, the supervisory levels of the agency must react swiftly and with certain discipline measures to ensure accountability and that the corruption stops immediately. The department should also be prepared to publicly report the incident, its investigation and outcomes, and accountability measures taken. To deny corruption exists and then have internal investigations prove otherwise will only deepen the divide between the police and community by fostering mistrust.
Is the criminal justice field the only one subjected to corruptive influence? Certainly not. Entry-level employees in fields such as health care, retail sales, and auto repair can all be “bought” or engage in some form of unapproved, “off-the-books” transactional activity, some of which may escalate to criminal behavior. Mid-level managers also engage in nefarious activities that take advantage of the public or their subordinates. Finally, corrupt behavior occupies higher echelons of workplaces in America: obsessively greedy companies and board rooms indifferent to known and apparent violations of policy or law. What separates these occupations, organizations, and the impact of their employees’ indiscretions from that of employees in the criminal legal system is the breach of public trust and confidence that accompanies the violations. Thus, the social contract between law enforcement officers and the community they serve must never be breached or taken for granted.
In the early 1970s, the Knapp Commission conducted an in-depth investigation of corruption in the New York Police Department (NYPD) and startled the world by revealing the depth and breadth of the criminal behaviors they found (Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, 1973). The investigation was launched after multiple allegations of illegal activity were brought to the attention of department investigators by Detective Frank Serpico some three years earlier. The report extended blame for conduct beyond NYPD to include some federal law enforcement agencies. In fact, much of the whistleblowers’ complaints would have easily been swept under the rug because leadership at the highest levels made extensive efforts to minimize the accusations or dismiss them altogether (Caldero et al., 2018).
The vast majority of officers are ethically fit to perform their duties. However, for others a phenomenon known as the “slippery slope” model of noble-cause corruption occurs almost immediately following the academy and persists through field training and into the later parts of the officer’s career. During the officer’s career, the shadowy element of the force may concoct certain unsanctioned “tests” to determine whether the new recruit can be trusted to maintain confidence. The slippery slope model (Baker, 1985) operates like this (as cited in Morey, 2019, paras. 8-11):
- “Forget everything you learned in training (school), I’ll show you how we really do it out here.” This is what an officer often first hears from a TO (training officer). The statement is only superficially about the lack of utility of higher education. What it is actually about is loyalty and the importance of protecting the local group of officers with whom the officer works.
- Mama Rosa. It looks like a free meal. This is not to test willingness to graft, but whether an officer is going to be loyal to other officers in the squad. It also serves to put officers together out of the station house.
- Loyalty Back-up. Here, an officer is tested to see if he or she will back up other officers. This is more involved because officers may have to ‘testify’ (give false testimony), dropsy (remove drugs from a suspect during a pat-down and then discover them in plain sight on the ground), the shake (similar to dropsy, only conducted during vehicle stops), or stiffing-in a call. These are like NC (noble-cause) actions, and may indeed by NC actions, but their purpose is to establish loyalty.
- Routine NC (Noble-Cause) Actions Against Citizens. Magic pencil skills increase penalties by shifting the crime upwards. Protect fellow officers with fictitious chargers. Construct probable cause. Illegal searches of vulnerable citizens.
The basic tenet of the examples above is that the police are in the community to solve and deter crime, and that officers must take whatever actions are necessary to stop criminal behavior. At the same time, there is a belief that the police should receive benefits from their services. Accordingly, officers begin to believe that “I am the law.” This viewpoint is the expected outcome of the old saying, “Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” We know that police officers do not enjoy absolute power, but with the condoning of the legal system in nearly every circumstance, police behaviors can even escalate to violence.
An example of this extreme behavior can be found in isolated police cliques or in an established quasi-sanctioned atmosphere. An example of the latter occurred in the Los Angeles Police Department CRASH unit in the 1990s, with the resultant Rampart scandal (Caldero et al., 2018). At that time, the Rampart Division of the LAPD was located in the most populated area of the city west of downtown. Beginning in the late 1970s into the 1980s, there was a significant upswing in violent crimes, particularly crimes involving street gang activity, illicit drugs, and weapons violations. In an effort to reduce crime, much of it street-gang initiated, and improve public safety, a specialized division of officers was assigned duties in the Rampart Division. Then-Chief Daryl Gates ordered the development of elite anti-gang units to infiltrate, mix with gang members, gather intelligence, and as a result, reduce or prevent violence from occurring. These anti-gang squads were known as CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) units.
By some accounts, CRASH enjoyed great success in crime reduction early on. But the officers who had been carefully selected for their fearlessness in engaging with gang members to gain their respect developed a reputation of being tough and not necessarily operating within the bounds of use-of-force policy. Many officers became emboldened and developed a subculture of their own. Because they were in a specialized unit no longer responding to routine calls for service, there was no need for them to wear conventional uniforms. Many CRASH officers began to dress in the style of the gangs they were investigating. It was inevitable that some officers were unable to resist the temptation to engage in corrupt activities, such as planting evidence or weapons on civilians during shakedowns, severely beating individuals who questioned officers’ tactics or talked back, stealing drugs during warrant services or street-level contacts, and selling narcotics.
An investigative task force was established in May 1998 by Chief Bernard Parks, during which time the actions of one CRASH officer, Rafael Perez, came under scrutiny (Caldero et al., 2018). Perez was found in possession of eight pounds of cocaine worth over $1 million that had been stolen from a police evidence locker earlier in the year. Perez agreed to cooperate with investigators, identifying over 70 officers, including supervisors, who engaged in corruption or disregarded Perez’s and others’ illegal and unethical practices (Bricker, 2024). It is noteworthy that the same agencies in which the scandals were perpetrated quickly investigated, stopped, and arrested those who had acted inappropriately. Even in the most extreme cases of corruption, there were ethical officers willing to enforce the law and hold those officers and supervisors accountable through criminal sanctions.
INVESTIGATIONS OF OFFICER CONDUCT
From time to time, law enforcement officers may find their actions scrutinized. The following are some examples of such routine investigations.
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ALLEGATIONS
Under 42 U.S.C. § 83 (Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 1979), state and local officers may be investigated for their conduct, acts, or omissions during performance of their duties while acting under the color of law. Thereafter, they may be subjected to civil lawsuits for any alleged violations of the plaintiff’s constitutional or civil rights. Federal officers acting under the color of law are similarly subject to investigation for their actions and civil suits but not under the Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights provision. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents (1971), federal officers executed a search warrant on Mr. Biven’s property, which resulted in property damages. In Bivens’s original claim against the officers, the court found that the Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights provision only applied to state and local officers. Bivens was counseled instead to file a federal tort claim citing violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (U.S. Const. amend. IV); this is known as a Bivens action.
Akin to the above are 18 U.S.C § 241 (Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens, 1948), involving conspiracy to commit civil and constitutional rights violations against civilians, and the closely aligned 18 U.S.C § 242 (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, 1948), when an officer has violated a citizen’s constitutional or civil rights under the color or authority of law.
OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS
Although rare given the number of daily interactions law enforcement officers have with the public, officer-involved shootings have occurred in many communities in the US, including the state of Washington (IACP, 2016). Some communities, as well as some statistical datasets, differ in their definition of an officer-involved shooting. For practical purposes, an officer-involved shooting is the discharge of a firearm accidentally or intentionally by a police officer who is in either on- or off-duty status. Shootings committed by officers while in an off-duty status are considered officer-involved shootings only if the officer is acting under the color or authority of law. It is immaterial if the target is a person or animal or if there was indeed an intended target at all (as in the case of an accidental discharge). The only exception to this definition is with sanctioned police firearms training. Some agencies have included different parameters or measurements in their definition to better meet their policy requirements. For example, depending on individual state law, officer-involved actions may not be classified as officer-involved shootings if they include deployment of less-lethal devices, such as electronic control devices, rubber bullets, bean bags, or stun devices. In the state of Washington, a death arising from an officer’s use or deployment of a less-lethal device will likely be investigated as a homicide whether it was a criminal taking of another’s life, justifiable, or excusable. The investigation of such cases are be directed under Wash. Admin. Code § 139.12.030 (2020).
It is important during an investigation to determine whether the officer-involved shooting incident was directed toward an armed or unarmed civilian. One study (Hemenway et al., 2019) found that on average, 56% of decedents who were fatally shot by police were armed with a firearm. The proportion of decedents who were armed with a firearm varied by state, ranging from a high of 89% in Idaho to a low of 25% in Vermont (para. 19). In another study (Premkumar, 2021), it was found that in about 80% of encounters resulting in death or a gunshot wound, the civilian was armed with a weapon, underscoring the risky environments officers face. When we consider civilians who sustained other serious injuries, 56% were unarmed (para. 5).
The officer’s ability to determine the need to use a firearm or a less-lethal device is precarious. There are many variables that may influence decision-making by both the officer and the civilian. These variables include, but are not limited to, ambient light, darkness, known information (e.g., arrest warrant status, previous violence toward officers, or known to be in possession of a weapon), furtive or sudden movements inconsistent with compliance, and other influences on perception. Imagine yourself working with a second officer in a dangerous, highly charged situation. You provide a verbal command to the civilian in a loud voice to “TURN AROUND, HANDS UP!” However, your partner sees something perceived as a weapon and immediately shouts, “GET DOWN ON THE GROUND NOW!” Under the best of circumstances, the civilian may be confused as to what to do next. A perceived failure to comply with either instruction might be interpreted as noncompliance, increasing the stress of the situation for all concerned. Add to this a civilian’s potential for impairment, mental illness, or a language barrier and greater anxiety may be presented.
Many concerns arise out of an escalation of force by police, let alone that presented in an officer-involved shooting, accidental discharge, or training incidents. Some of these concerns include:
- Potential breach of trust in the social contract with the community
- Civil suits and possible criminal findings involving deprivation of one’s civil rights
- The mental stress and potential PTSD issues surrounding the details of the actual discharge, workplace investigations, administrative leave of the officer pending the outcome of an investigation, and any physical trauma sustained by the officer, partner, or civilian involved (Amendola, 2020)
When a law enforcement officer is confronted with a life-threatening situation (one creating a risk of death or serious physical injury) to the officer or others, training will compel the officer to make a decision as to how best to stop the threat. Making it even more challenging is the officer is usually behind the action/reaction time gap (J. Green, personal communication, February 27, 2024). Whatever means chosen must be both reasonable (a similarly trained, experienced officer faced with this situation would make this or a similar choice), and necessary (in the mind of the officer, no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist, and the amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended). These definitions of law were derived from landmark cases, such as Graham v. Connor (1989), Tennessee v. Garner (1985), and other court cases emphasizing officer use of force.
Officers are bound to follow policy. Most agencies today forbid firing warning shots, and training dictates that if the decision is made to employ deadly force against another person, it will be to stop the threat. Intentionally shooting a knife or firearm out of a violator’s hand, or shooting someone in the leg, although shown routinely on television and movies, are not appropriate tactical choices. Arms and legs are often in motion, and under stress, even highly trained officers with excellent shooting skills may miss their target.
The critical factor in these types of investigations of a law enforcement officer’s actions is the officer’s ability to clearly articulate the actions they took and specifically what violator actions forced them to take the actions they did. As a result of legislative changes (Wash. Admin. Code § 139.12.030, 2020), an officer involved in an officer-involved shooting in Washington State will likely be investigated by an agency or team in their county. Their own agency will not conduct the investigation due to potential conflict-of-interest concerns. The investigation will also include the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Center and the state Attorney General’s Office. These investigations are initially criminal in nature. Officers under investigation can use all due process and other constitutional protections afforded to any other citizen (J. Green, personal communication, February 27, 2024).
ACCOUNTABILITY CERTIFICATION AND DECERTIFICATION
The vast majority of 21st century police administrators strive for excellence in their departments. Many seek police accreditation through the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) or, in the case of some federal agencies, the Federal Law Enforcement Accreditation Board (FLETA). States train and issue certification to officers who pass extensive training regimens. These certifications include the officer’s credentials authorizing them to perform police functions. The public can look at an officer’s credentials and be assured that they have met or exceeded minimum standards for policing in their community.
In the event an officer is involved in situations involving misconduct, untruthfulness, or unlawful deception, or they are unable to perform their law enforcement duties any longer, the certification and accompanying credentials may be suspended or revoked. Certification suspension or revocation is a serious matter; the officer generally may not move to another agency to carry on or start over as a police officer. In more extreme cases, investigations to an officer’s performance may lead to criminal charges.
The Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission (2024) establishes certification and training standards that are legally defensible and scientifically valid to ensure criminal justice professionals in Washington have the knowledge and skills to safely protect the communities they serve. The Commission is also charged with reviewing officer disqualifying conduct for the purposes of suspending or decertifying police officers for cause.
Derived from Graham v. Connor, reasonable as it relates to a "reasonable officer" is determined by the facts and circumstances known to the officer at that moment, i.e., how might a hypothetical reasonable officer process the information and act in that moment.
Appropriate, suitable, and proper. For example, no reasonable, effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist, and the amount of force used was reasonable and proportionate to effect the lawful purpose intended.