In our society, a police officer is vested with considerable power. Given certain facts, the officer can interrupt or suspend a person’s Constitutional freedoms. Add to this the proposition that officers, after requisite training and skill performance, are also given the authority to use, carry and display firearms for the protection of the officer or other persons. If a situation warranting the use of deadly force presents itself, the officer’s authority to take the life of another person is granted. It is, in large part because of the conferring of such “privileges” on a person who has risen through a rigorous hiring and training process, certain officers may fall prey to a sense of superiority over others. This can lead to corruption at levels ranging from minor and possibly unnoticed, to scandalous (and possibly criminal) events.

“The Bureau of Justice confirmed that only 0.02% of the police officers in the U.S. engage in some type of corruption” (as cited in Morey, 2019, para. 2). It is happening, and even at such a small percentage, we cannot lose sight of the fact that people are being victimized by it. We must remember that the media–print, online, or televised—is a “for-profit” business, and the best way to accomplish the bottom line of selling stories is to create sensational, often salacious, headlines or on-air openings meant to focus a viewer’s attention on the screen. Is it believable that the opening “breaking news” segment involving an officer-involved shooting is bound to find that the officer acted in a wilful or wanton disregard for the life of the victim? When the police representative, often an expert and seasoned public information officer, is asked questions at the scene, their response beyond the most basic piece of information will be “No comment.” This is often perceived by viewers that the police have something to hide, or that some corrupt action took place at some stage of the interaction with the victim. In fact, the investigation is likely only minutes old, and will often take days, weeks, months, and sometimes over a year to provide details to determine exactly what took place and place fault where it belongs. In Washington state, Wash. Admin. Code § 139.12.030 (2020) mandates independent investigations, to remove bias and in an effort to improve departmental transparency. The media will likely move on from the story if details are provided transparently, as they are learned and can be released for public consumption without compromising the investigation. The independent investigation team (IIT) is responsible for the release of this information once the investigation is complete.

In the time frame of an independently-conducted police investigation, the notion of a “cover-up” by the police can be reinforced. Unless and until the investigation is concluded and the officer’s actions are validated, no one—the public, media representatives, and even others within the officer’s own agency—can truly appreciate why the officer acted, processed actions or made tactical force decisions to the situation the way they did. The purpose of the independent investigation is to look at the facts known–both at the time of the incident, and how it was perceived at that time by the officer–and afterward, in the form of physical evidence, witness statements, video and audio captured, and other details pertinent to the investigation.

It is because of the public trust and confidence placed on the officer in this dramatic, stressful, yet glamorous occupation, that corruption cannot be allowed to occur, and certainly not to be disregarded if noticed. Condoning corruption by one paints a broad brush across the profession. If allegations of corruption are made, they must be rigorously investigated, and, if warranted, it falls on the supervisory levels of the agency to react swiftly and with certain discipline measures to ensure both accountability and that the corruption stops then and there. The department should also be prepared to report the incident, its investigation and outcomes, and accountability measures taken, publicly. To deny corruption exists, then have proof of internal investigations proving otherwise, will only deepen the divide between the police and community by fostering mistrust.

Is the criminal justice field the only one subjected to corruptive influence? Certainly not. Entry-level employees in fields such as health care, retail sales, auto repair, all can be “bought” or engage in some form of unapproved, “off-the-books” transactional activity, some of which may escalate to criminal behavior. Mid-level managers also engage in nefarious activities that take advantage of the public or subordinate employees due to the power of their positions. Finally, corrupt behavior occupies higher echelons of workplaces in America—company owners who become obsessed with greed, board rooms that show indifference to known and apparent violations of policy or law. What separates these occupations, organizations, and the impact of indiscretions of employees, from that of employees of the criminal legal system, is the magnification of the breach of public trust and confidence that accompanies the violation. Thus, the social contract between law enforcement officers and the community they serve ought to NEVER be breached, nor taken for granted.

In the early 1970s, the Knapp Commission conducted an in-depth investigation of corruption in the New York Police Department (NYPD) and startled the world by revealing the depth and breadth of criminal behaviors they found (Commission to Investigate Alleged Police Corruption, 1973). The investigation was launched after multiple allegations of illegal activity were brought to the attention of Department investigators by Detective Frank Serpico some three years earlier. The report extended blame for conduct beyond NYPD, to include some federal law enforcement agencies. In fact, much of the whistle-blowers’ complaints would have easily been swept under the rug because of extensive efforts by leadership at the highest levels to minimize the accusations or dismiss them altogether (Caldero et al., 2018).

The vast majority of officers will be ethically fit to perform their duties. For others, a phenomenon known as the “slippery slope” model of noble-cause corruption appears almost immediately following the academy, and persists through the officer’s field training, association with peers in the department, and is pervasive even into the later parts of the officer’s career. There is a slippery slope model of noble-cause corruption recognized in the discipline of the criminal legal system, and along the way, certain unsanctioned “tests” of the officer may occur, mainly to determine by the shadowy element of the force whether the new recruit can be trusted to maintain confidence.

The slippery slope model (Baker, 1985) generally looks like this (as cited in Morey, 2019, paras. 8-11):

1. “Forget everything you learned in training (school), I’ll show you how we really do it out here.” This is what an officer often first hears from a TO (training officer). The statement is only superficially about the lack of utility of higher education. What it is actually about is loyalty and the importance of protecting the local group of officers with whom the officer works.
2. Mama Rosa. It looks like a free meal. This is not to test willingness to graft, but whether an officer is going to be loyal to other officers in the squad. It also serves to put officers together out of the station house.
3. Loyalty Back-up. Here, an officer is tested to see if he or she will back up other officers. This is more involved because officers may have to ‘testify’ (give false testimony), dropsy (remove drugs from a suspect during a pat-down and then discover them in plain sight on the ground), the shake (similar to dropsy, only conducted during vehicle stops), or stiffing-in a call. These are like NC (noble-cause) actions, and may indeed by NC actions, but their purpose is to establish loyalty.
4. Routine NC (Noble-Cause) Actions Against Citizens. Magic pencil skills increase penalties by shifting the crime upwards. Protect fellow officers with fictitious chargers. Construct probable cause. Illegal searches of vulnerable citizens.

All of the above examples of the Slippery Slope Model (Morey, 2019) are conducted with the basic tenet that the police are in the community to solve and deter crime, and that officers must take whatever actions are necessary to stop criminal behavior–but at the same time, the police should have benefits from their services. The view that “I am the law” is sometimes taken by officers over time with that belief structure. However, this viewpoint is really the expected outcome of the old saying, “power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” We know that police officers do not enjoy absolute power, but with the backing of the legal system in nearly every circumstance, police behaviors can even escalate to violence.

An example of this extreme can be found within some isolated police cliques, or even in an established, quasi-sanctioned atmosphere such as what occurred within the Los Angeles Police Department CRASH unit in the 1990s, and the resultant Rampart Division scandal (Caldero et al., 2018). In an effort to reduce crime (much of which was street-gang initiated) and improve public safety, a specialized division of officers was assigned duties in the Rampart Division of the Los Angeles Police Department. At that time, the Rampart Division was located in the most populated area of the city west of downtown. Beginning in the late 1970s into the 1980s, this area of the city saw a significant upswing in violent crimes, particularly crimes involving street gang activity, illicit drugs, and weapons violations. In response, then-Chief Daryl Gates ordered the development of elite anti-gang units to infiltrate, mix with gang members, gather intelligence, and as a result, reduce or prevent violence from occurring. These anti-gang squads were known as CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) units.

By some accounts, CRASH enjoyed great success in crime reduction early on in the project. The officers who had been carefully selected for their fearlessness in engaging with gang members in order to gain their respect, developed a reputation of being tough and not necessarily operating within the bounds of use-of-force policy. In fact, many officers became emboldened, developing a subculture of its own. Because they were in a specialized unit, they were no longer subjected to responding to routine calls for service, so there was no need for them to wear conventional uniforms. Many CRASH officers began to dress in the style of the gangs they were investigating. It was inevitable that some officers were unable to resist the temptation to engage in corrupt activities such as planting evidence or weapons on civilians during “shakedowns,” severely beating individuals who questioned officers’ tactics or talked back, stealing drugs during warrant services or street-level contacts, and selling narcotics. Finally, an investigative task force was established in May 1998 by Chief Bernard Parks, during which time the actions of one CRASH officer, Rafael Perez, came under scrutiny (Caldero et al., 2018).

Perez was found in possession of eight pounds of cocaine, worth over $1 million, stolen from a police evidence locker earlier in the year. Perez agreed to provide cooperation with investigators, identifying over 70 officers, including supervisors who either committed acts of corruption or disregarded the illegal and unethical practices of Perez and others (Bricker, 2024).

It is important to note that the same agencies in which the scandals were perpetrated, quickly investigated, stopped, and arrested those who had acted inappropriately. It helps demonstrate that, even in the most extreme cases of corruption, there were still ethical officers willing to enforce the law and hold those officers and supervisors in violation accountable through criminal sanctions.

INVESTIGATIONS OF OFFICER CONDUCT

From time to time, law enforcement officers may find their actions scrutinized. The following are some examples of such investigations routinely conducted.

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ALLEGATIONS

Under Title 42, Section 83 of the U. S. Code (Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 1979), state and local officers may be investigated for their conduct, acts or omissions during performance of their duties and while acting under color of law. As such, they may be subjected to a civil lawsuit by plaintiffs for alleged violations of the plaintiff’s Constitutional or civil rights.

Federal officers acting under the color of law are similarly subject to investigation for their actions and civil suit, but not under the Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights (1979) code. This federal statute is intended solely for state and local officers. Federal officers’ actions will be considered under the Bivens analogy, derived from a court action entitled Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents (1971). As the name implies, this case arose out of the actions of federal officers who executed a search warrant on Mr. Biven’s property with resultant damages. Regarding Bivens’s original claim against the officers, the court found that the statute only applied to state and local officers. Instead, Bivens was counseled to file a federal tort claim citing violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (U.S. Const. amend. IV).

Akin to the above are Title 18, Section 241 of the U.S. Code (Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens, 1948), involving conspiracy to commit civil and constitutional rights violations against civilians, and the closely aligned Title 18, Section 242 of the U.S. Code (Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, 1948), where an officer allegedly violates a citizen’s constitutional or civil rights by actions committed under the color or authority of law.

OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING AND EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIONS

Despite the rarity when compared to the number of interactions law enforcement officers have with the public each day, many communities in the United States of America, including the state of Washington, have experienced officer-involved shootings (IACP, 2016). Some communities, as well as some statistical datasets, differ in the definition of an officer-involved shooting. In all practical purposes, an officer-involved shooting can be defined as the discharge of a firearm, which may include an accidental or intentional discharge, by a police officer who is in either on- or off-duty status. It should be noted here that shootings committed by officers while in off-duty status are considered “officer-involved shootings” only if the officer is acting under the color or authority of law. In this case, the weapon for whom a police officer controls or is responsible for, fires. It is immaterial if the target is a person, animal, or if there was indeed an intended target at all (in the case of an accidental discharge). The only exception to this definition is in terms of sanctioned police firearms training. As previously mentioned, some agencies have identified different parameters or measurements to their definition in order to better meet their policy requirements. For example, officer-involved actions may not be classified as “officer-involved shootings” if they include deployment of less-lethal devices such as electronic control devices, rubber bullets, bean bags, stun devices, etc., depending upon individual state law. In the state of Washington, a death arising from an officer’s use or deployment of a “less-lethal” device will likely be investigated as a “homicide”, and whether it was a criminal taking of another’s life, or justifiable, or excusable, depending upon the circumstances. The investigation of such cases would be directed under Wash. Admin. Code § 139.12.030 (2020).

It is important for an investigation to further determine if the officer-involved shooting incident was directed toward an “armed civilian” or an “unarmed civilian.” One study (Hemenway et al., 2019) found that:

On average, 56% of decedents who were fatally shot by police were armed with a firearm. The proportion of decedents who were armed with a firearm varied by state, ranging from a high of 89% in Idaho to a low of 25% in Vermont. (para. 19)

Further, another study (Premkumar, 2021) found that:

In about 80 percent of encounters resulting in death or a gunshot wound, the civilian was armed with a weapon, underscoring the risky environments officers face. However, when we also consider civilians who sustained other serious injuries, 56 percent were unarmed. (para. 5)

The ability for an officer to differentiate between the two follows a very fine line, with many variables which may influence decision-making by both the officer and the civilian. These variables include, but are not limited to, ambient light, darkness, known information (such as arrest warrant status, previous violence toward officers, or known to be in possession of a weapon), furtive or sudden movements inconsistent with compliance, and other influences on perception. Imagine yourself, working with a second officer, dealing with a dangerous, highly-charged situation. You provide verbal commands directed to the civilian in a loud voice, to “TURN AROUND, HANDS UP!” However, your partner sees something perceived as a weapon, and immediately shouts, “GET DOWN ON THE GROUND NOW!” Under the best of circumstances, the civilian may be confused as to what to do next. A perceived failure to comply with either instruction might be interpreted to be non-compliance, increasing the stress of the situation for all concerned. Add to this a civilian’s potential for impairment, mental illness, a language barrier, etc., and greater anxiety may be presented.

Many concerns arise out of an escalation of force by police, let alone that presented in an officer-involved shooting, accidental discharge, or training incidents. Some of these concerns include:

• Potential breach of trust in the social contract with the community;
• Civil suits and possible criminal findings involving deprivation of one’s civil rights;
• The mental stress, and potential PTSD issues, surrounding the details of the actual discharge, workplace investigations, administrative leave of the officer pending outcomes of an investigation, and any physical trauma sustained by the officer, partner, or civilian involved (Amendola, 2020).

Make no mistake about it, when a law enforcement officer is confronted with a life-threatening situation (one creating a risk of death or serious physical injury) to the officer or others, training will compel the officer to make a decision as to how best to stop the threat. To make it even more challenging, the officer is usually behind the action/reaction time gap (J. Green, personal communication, February 27, 2024). Whatever means chosen must be both reasonable (would a similarly-trained and experienced officer, faced with this situation, make this (or a similar) choice?), and necessary (where, in the mind of the officer, no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force appeared to exist, and the amount of force used was reasonable to effect the lawful purpose intended). These definitions of law are derivatives from well-established case law in Graham v. Connor (1989), Tennessee v. Garner (1985), and other court cases emphasizing officer use of force.

Officers will also be policy-bound: most agencies today forbid firing warning shots, and training dictates that if the decision is made to employ deadly force against another person, it will be to stop the threat. Intentionally shooting a knife or firearm out of a violator’s hand, or shooting someone in the leg, though shown routinely on television and movies, are not appropriate tactical choices. Arms and legs are often in motion, and under stress, even highly-trained officers with excellent shooting skills may miss their target. Others dissociated from the event often do not accept this explanation, especially if they are a family member or close acquaintance of the perpetrator.

The critical factor in these types of investigations of a law enforcement officer’s actions is the officer’s ability to clearly articulate the actions they took, and specifically, what violator actions forced them to take the actions they did. An officer involved in an officer-involved shooting in Washington state, as a result of legislative changes (Wash. Admin. Code § 139.12.030, 2020), will likely be investigated by an agency or team in their county (not their own agency due to potential conflict-of-interest concerns. The investigation will also include the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Center and the state Attorney General’s Office. These investigations are initially criminal in nature. It should be expected that many will use all due process and other Constitutional protections afforded to any other citizen (J. Green, personal communication, February 27, 2024).

ACCOUNTABILITY-CERTIFICATION AND DECERTIFICATION

The vast majority of twenty-first century police administrators strive for excellence in their departments. Many seek police accreditation, Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), or, in the case of some federal agencies, that provided by the Federal Law Enforcement Accreditation Board (FLETA), are examples. States train and issue certification to officers who pass extensive training regimens successfully. These certifications include the officer’s credentials authorizing them to perform police functions. The public, then, can look at an officer’s credentials and have assurances that they have met or exceeded minimum standards for policing their community.

In the event that an officer is involved in situations involving misconduct, untruthfulness, unlawful deception, or under certain circumstances, are unable to perform their law enforcement duties any longer, the certification and accompanying credentials may be suspended or revoked. This suspension or revocation of certification is a serious matter; the officer generally may not move to another agency to carry on or start over as a police officer. In more extreme cases, investigations to an officer’s performance may lead to criminal charges.

In Washington, the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission (2024) establishes certification and training standards which are legally defensible and scientifically valid to ensure criminal justice professionals in Washington have the knowledge and skills to safely protect the communities they serve. The Commission is also charged with reviewing officer disqualifying conduct for the purposes of suspending or decertifying police officers for cause.